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Half a millennium of intermittent civil conflict, foreign invasions, and even 
genocide not only devastated Cambodia, but also prevented the Khmer peo-
ple from weighing their experiences in historical perspective. Hindu, Bud-
dhist, royalist, republican, colonial and communist regimes came and went. 
Five relocations of the Khmer capital in as many centuries preceded the 
three foreign occupations and seven regime changes of the past sixty years 
alone. Time and again, officials abandoned archives. Rulers erased rivals 
from the record. International leaders denied Cambodia's history or blocked 
its documentation. Yet recent events offer hope at least of an accounting for 
the Khmer Rouge genocide of 1975-1979.1 
A substantial corpus of inscriptions and archaeological sites, like the 
twelfm-century Hindu temple of Angkor Wat, testify to Cambodia's medie-
val glory. Then, around 1432, the Khmer court moved downriver, founding a 
new capital, Lovek. Buddhist monks maintained Angkor, but its perishable 
palm-leaf records vanished. In 1594, a Thai army sacked Lovek. Within two 
years, Spanish and Portuguese conquistadores from Manila raided and razed 
its successor, Srei Santhor. Later royal attempts to chronicle Cambodia's fif-
teenth and sixteenth centuries were, as historian Michael Vickery has shown, 
"composed artificially" from Thai court chronicles for lack of Khmer 
sources.2 Cambodian events stayed in shadow. 
Civil wars also wracked the country, leaving little record. A rare inscrip-
tion carved at Angkor in 1747 celebrates the Khmer king's defeat of an un-
named rebel princess. Tracking down her forces by "blocking and searching 
every road," the royal army "drove out, pursued and scattered" (kchat kchay) 
the rebels, showing them "the power of the monarch." The king's forces pre-
sented him with "many of the slaves and possessions of the princess" and all 
her "commanders, troops, and goods." 3 Her fate, like so much of Cambo-
dian history, passed into silence. 
1 An abridged version of this article appeared in History Today (London), September 
2004, pp. 16-19. 
2 M. Vickery, Cambodia After Angkor: the Chronicular Evidence for the 14th to 16th 
Centuries, Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1977. 
3 Silacarik Nagar Vatt Ning Pateanukram, Phnom Penh, Buddhist Institute, 1958,114. 
For a different translation see D. P. Chandler, An Eighteenth Century Inscription 
from Angkor Wat, in: Journal of the Siam Society, July 1971, p. 158. 
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Ethnic violence followed. "The Cambodians have massacred all the 
Cochinchinese [Vietnamese] that they could find in the country," wrote a 
French missionary in 1751. The new Khmer king, Ang Snguon, "gave orders 
or permission to massacre all the Cochinchinese who could be found, and 
this order was executed very precisely and very cruelly; this massacre lasted 
a month and a half; only about twenty women and children were spared; no 
one knows the number of deaths, and it would be very difficult to find out, 
for the massacre was general from Cahon to Ha-tien, with the exception of a 
few who were able to escape through the forest or fled by sea." No survivors 
were found of the numerous Vietnamese residents in Cambodia.4 Nor do 
other records of that pogrom survive. 
Better-documented conflicts raged for a century. From the west, Thailand 
seized the Angkor region. Vietnam encroached from the east. Then France 
colonized Vietnam, and in 1863, imposed a Protectorate on Cambodia. The 
French moved the capital from Oudong to Phnom Penh, re-took Angkor 
from Thailand, and restored its archaeological sites. But the colonialists ne-
glected Khmer education. Pagoda schools declined; literacy rates fell. Ninety 
years of colonial rule produced only 144 Khmer Baccalauréats!1 
While history publishing flourished in colonial Vietnam, even educated 
Cambodians lacked access to Khmer-language historical sources, which 
French and royal officials often suppressed to monopolise state legitimacy. 
After Cambodia's independence, the regime of Prince Norodom Sihanouk 
(1954-70) greatly expanded education. But, as Sihanouk's adviser Charles 
Meyer later recalled with near accuracy, the kingdom permitted publication 
in Khmer of "no serious work of history, politics, economics or literature."6 
In the 1960s, as U.S. forces intervened in the war in neighbouring Viet-
nam, Sihanouk tried to keep Cambodia neutral. His ouster in 1970 brought 
several contending armies, Vietnamese and American, crashing over the 
border. Cambodia became a theatre of the Vietnam War. "That damned Air 
Force can do more about hitting Cambodia with their bombing attacks," 
President Nixon told Henry Kissinger on the telephone on December 9, 
1970. "I want a plan where every goddamn thing that can fly goes into Cam-
bodia and hits every target that is open ... everything. I want them to use the 
big planes, the small planes, everything they can." Kissinger ordered "a mas-
4 A. Launay, Histoire de la Mission de Cochinchine 1658-1823, II, Paris, 1924, pp. 
366-70. 
5 See B. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Cambo-
dia, 1930-1975 (London 1985, pp. xii-xiv), second edition, Yale University Press, 
2004, Introduction. 
6 C. Meyer, Derrière le sourire khmer, Paris 1971, p. 181. 
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sive bombing campaign in Cambodia. Anything that flies on anything that 
moves."7 By 1973, half a million tons of U.S. bombs had killed over 100,000 
peasants and devastated the countryside.8 On May 2 of that year, the Direc-
torate of Operations of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reported the re-
sults of its investigations in Kandal province: 
1. Khmer Insurgent (KI [Khmer Rouge]) cadre have begun an intensified prose-
lyting [sic] campaign among ethnic Cambodian residents in the area of Chrouy 
Snao, Kaoh Thom district, Kandal province, Cambodia, in an effort to recruit 
young men and women for KI military organizations. They are using damage 
caused by B-52 strikes as the main theme of their propaganda. The cadre tell the 
people that the Government of Lon Nol has requested the airstrikes and is re-
sponsible for the damage and the "suffering of innocent villagers" in order to 
keep himself in power. The only way to stop "the massive destruction of the 
country" is to remove Lon Nol and return Prince Sihanouk to power. The prose-
lyting [sic] cadres tell the people that the quickest way to accomplish this is to 
strengthen KI forces so they will be able to defeat Lon Nol and stop the bomb-
ing. 
2. This approach has resulted in the successful recruitment of a number of young 
men for KI forces. Residents around Chrouy Snao say that the propaganda cam-
paign has been effective with refugees and in areas of Kaoh Thom and Leuk Dek 
districts which have been subject to B-52 strikes.9 
The U.S. bombing thus helped the guerrillas of Pol Pot's Communist Party 
of Kampuchea (CPK, or Khmer Rouge) to recruit vengeful survivors, whom 
they misled, claiming that "The killing birds came from Phnom Penh." The 
Khmer Rouge army expanded, and shelled the capital, diverting history 
against innocent urban dwellers. 
American officialdom continues to ignore this history, or bury its docu-
mentation in untraceable footnotes. In 2003, Henry Kissinger revealed in his 
book, Ending the Vietnam War, that he requested an estimate of the Cambo-
dian civilian casualties of the US bombing from the Historical Office of the 
US Secretary of Defense (OSD). The Office, Kissinger says, "gave me an 
estimate of 50,000 based on the tonnage of bombs delivered over a period of 
four and a half years." Kissinger cites this OSD figure only in a footnote 
leading to an endnote quoting two paragraphs excerpted from an unnamed, 
7 The Kissinger Telcons, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. accessed May 
29, 2004: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB123/. 
8 B. Kiernan, The American Bombardment of Kampuchea, 1969-1973, in: Vietnam 
Generation, 1:1 (Winter 1989): 4-41. 
9 United States, Central Intelligence Agency (1973), Efforts of Khmer Insurgents to 
Exploit for Propaganda Purposes Damage Done by Airstrikes in Kandal Province, 
Intelligence Information Cable, May 2, 1973, Directorate of Operations, declassified 
February 19,1987. 
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undated memo, "on civilian casualties in Cambodia." Kissinger omits to 
quote the actual passage containing the estimate of 50,000 casualties. In his 
endnote, he quotes the OSD only as stating: "B-52 area bombers accounted 
for a much higher proportion of bomb tonnage in Cambodia than in North 
Vietnam - two-thirds in Cambodia versus a quarter in North Vietnam. Dur-
ing 1969-1973 in Cambodia, it was difficult for reporters in Phnom Penh to 
estimate the proportion of civilian casualties caused by air operations. There 
is no doubt that most of those casualties occurred in 1973 ... Reporters in 
Phnom Penh could see that many nearby villages had been destroyed by 
bombing. According to the American air commander, General Vogt, those 
villages had already been vacated by civilians fleeing into the city. . . The 
worst error occurred at Neak Luong, when more than a hundred civilians 
were k i l l ed . . . " 1 0 But many similar incidents went unreported. The unveri-
fied official estimate of 50,000 dead may be regarded as a minimum, in a 
possible range of 50,000-150,000 Cambodian civilians killed by US bomb-
ing from 1969 to 1973.11 
CPK internecine purges also accelerated during the U.S. bombardment. 
Portending the genocide to come, the purges targeted ethnic as well as politi-
cal groups. After secretly and systematically killing nearly all of the one 
thousand Khmer communists returned from training in Hanoi, in 1973/74 
Pol Pot's "Party Center" (mocchim paks) stepped up violence against ethnic 
Vietnamese civilian residents of Cambodia It also purged and killed ethnic 
Thai and other minority members of the CPK's Western and Northeast Zone 
committees, banned an allied group of ethnic Cham Muslim revolutionaries 
in the East, and instigated severe repression of Muslim communities. Other 
victims of the Center included its Sihanoukist allies, moderate local commu-
nists, and more independent Marxists such as Hou Yuon, a popular Paris-
educated intellectual who had differed with Pol Pot. The Center marginal-
ized Hou Yuon, then murdered him in 1975. 
The Khmer Rouge won the war in April 1975. They emptied Cambodia's 
cities into the countryside, persecuting and murdering the deported towns-
people, who tended to be more educated than the peasantry. Pol Pot's new 
communist regime, called Democratic Kampuchea (DK), also committed 
genocide against the Khmer Buddhist monkhood, the traditional bearers of 
cultural literacy. D K expelled 150,000 Vietnamese residents from Cambo-
dia, killed all 10,000 who stayed, and carried out larger, less systematic 
genocide against the country's Chinese and Muslim minorities. In all, 1.7 
10 H. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, New York 2003, pp. 70 n., 586 n.7 
11 For details see B. Kiernan, The American Bombardment of Kampuchea, 1969-1973, 
Vietnam Generation, 1:1, Winter 1989, pp. 4-41. 
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million people died in four years. Upgrading the traditional term for routing 
enemies, DK's slogan became kchat kchay os roling ("scatter them to the 
last").12 Targeting history too, the Khmer Rouge scattered libraries, burned 
books, closed schools, and murdered schoolteachers. Three-quarters of 
Cambodia's 20,000 teachers perished, or fled abroad.13 
As the genocide progressed, for geopolitical reasons, Washington, Bei-
jing, and Bangkok all supported the continued independent existence of the 
Khmer Rouge regime. When U.S. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of 
State Kissinger visited Indonesian president Suharto on 6 December 1975, 
the transcript released in 2001 reveals that Ford, deploring the recent U.S. 
defeat in Vietnam, told Suharto: "There is, however, resistance in Cambodia 
to the influence of Hanoi. We are willing to move slowly in our relations 
with Cambodia, hoping perhaps to slow down the North Vietnamese influ-
ence although we find the Cambodian government very difficult." Kissinger 
explained Beijing's similar strategy: "the Chinese want to use Cambodia to 
balance off Vietnam....We don't like Cambodia, for the government in 
many ways is worse than Vietnam, but we would like it to be independent. 
We don't discourage Thailand or China from drawing closer to Cambo-
dia."14 
When the Vietnamese communist army overthrew the Khmer Rouge in 
January 1979, the new People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) re-opened 
the cities and schools, but faced an international embargo led by China, the 
USA, and Thailand. A Cambodian education official recalled starting from 
nothing, "in shorts."15 A UN consultant found a school "surrounded by 
mines and graveyards." Another school possessed eight pens per class of 50 
pupils. A class that met under a tree had to stop for the rainy season. Some 
students were "completely naked."16 
With Vietnamese aid the PRK re-opened the Teachers' College, and 
printed forty school textbooks by 1980. But for a decade, Cambodian 
schools offered no history subjects; only classes on "Political Morality" and 
12 Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic 
Kampuchea, 1976/77, ed. C. Boua, D. Chandler and B. Kieman, New Haven, Yale 
Council on Southeast Asia Studies, 1988, p. 170. 
13 D. Ayres, Anatomy of a Crisis: Education, Development and the State in Cambodia, 
1953-1998, Honolulu 2000, pp. 126,217 n.16. 
14 US Embassy Jakarta to Secretary State, 6 Dec. 1975, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ 
NSAEBB/NSAEBB62. 
15 J. Jordens, A 1991 State of Cambodia Political Education Text: Exposition and 
Analysis, Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Working Paper 71, 
Clayton, Victoria, Australia, 1991, p. 6. 
16 Ayres, Anatomy of a Crisis (n. 13), p. 133. 
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Folk Tales. D K destruction of books was not the sole reason for the curricu-
lum gap. Vietnamese advisors at the new Education Ministry planned a new, 
revolutionary history syllabus, but the PRK dragged its feet.17 One official 
explained that the country's history had yet to be written! Yet from 1985 to 
1987, the PRK banned as "incorrect" even a new 584-page Khmer-language 
history of Cambodia, published in the USSR. 1 8 In 1986 the Ministry pub-
lished, but withheld from schools, a new fifth-grade history textbook.19 
Some suspected Cambodian history would be "approved" only when defined 
in terms of Vietnamese history. 
None of Cambodia's pre-1975 professors or lecturers who had remained 
in the country survived the Khmer Rouge genocide. But from 1979 the P R K 
trained a hundred new tertiary educators. In 1988, after thirteen years, 
Phnom Penh University re-opened its doors, with 2,000 students. Seventy 
were studying History, including ten majors. The new History Department 
comprised two former graduates with licences ès lettres from the pre-1975 
Faculty of Arts, and three post-1980 Teachers' College graduates. They had 
already co-authored new history school texts, including the 1986 book, 
which now went into use in fifth grade classes, accompanied by three new 
texts for higher grades. At each level, pupils began to study Cambodian His-
tory and World History. 
Classes addressed some symbolic issues. For instance, the fifth-grade text 
tried to assess Vietnam's nineteenth century interventions in Cambodia. In 
that era, the Vietnamese court at Hue had vied with Thailand for dominance 
over the Cambodian court at Oudong. The textbook informed pupils that, to 
escape Bangkok's control, "our Khmer kings ran to rely on the feudalists in 
the east, that is, the Vietnamese kingdom." Hue's intervention "became 
steadily more active," especially in the court of King Ang Chan II (1794— 
1834). Thailand, too, "used force to pressure King Ang Chan II and to en-
courage him to accept absolute Thai sovereignty. Worried by such pressure, 
King Ang Chan II requested help from the Hue court." Vietnamese troops 
invaded, defeating the Thai. However, 
King Ang Chan II died in 1834 leaving no heir. The Hue court at this time had 
very great influence over the Khmer royal family and it began to use manoeuvres 
to enthrone Princess Ang Mey, who was a daughter of King Ang Chan II, as 
ruler of the kingdom. In order to strengthen its own influence and eliminate Thai 
influence, the Hue court intervened in the internal affairs of the Oudong court 
17 Ayres, Anatomy of a Crisis (n. 13), pp. 134,219. 
18 Y. Y. Miheyev, Prowatisas songkep nei prates kampuchea, Moscow, 1985, 584 pp.; 
Ayres, Anatomy of a Crisis (n. 13), p. 219. 
19 Provattvichea (Grade 5), Phnom Penh, Ministry of Education, 1986,106 pp. 
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with increasing power. Thus it happened that the city of Bangkok pressured 
Cambodia more powerfully, and along with this the court and the people of 
Cambodia were not happy either.20 
That fairly frank discussion of past Vietnamese interventions was not 
matched by lessons on the Khmer Rouge genocide. Even after Hanoi's 
forces left Cambodia in 1989, few students gained access to primary docu-
ments or secondary accounts of its recent past. Crowds thronged the museum 
that had been DK's notorious Tuol Sleng prison. Western scholars perused 
its archives of torture and murder.21 Cambodian governments, excluded from 
the United Nations, protested the exiled DK regime's presence there. An of-
ficial eleventh-grade 1991 political education text lamented: "During the Pol 
Pot regime, the Cambodian people lived in hopelessness, without meaning, 
and in constant fear; in addition they suffered every kind of oppression [by] 
those violent savage murderers, and were transformed into the slaves of that 
gang."22 Yet school history classes omitted the Khmer Rouge period alto-
gether. 
The vacuum fostered an uneasy relationship with Cambodia's past, and 
its neighbours. In January 2003, a Thai TV star reportedly asserted that 
Angkor belonged to Thailand. Khmer protestors sacked the Thai embassy in 
Phnom Penh. Gangs torched a Thai airline office, hotels, and restaurants. Yet 
Cambodian schoolteachers still have to skirt the Khmer Rouge genocide. In 
2001 the Education Ministry published new history texts, which finally in-
cluded sections on DK, but recalled them in 2003 after a semester of use. 
International actors also fostered a lack of accountability. Behind the 
scenes, the ousted Khmer Rouge received U.S. support from the Carter, 
Reagan and first Bush administrations. Carter's national security advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski recalled Kissinger's earlier policy when he revealed 
that in 1979, "I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot. Pol Pot was an 
abomination. We could never support him, but China could." According to 
Brzezinski, Washington "winked, semi-publicly" at Chinese and Thai aid to 
the Khmer Rouge. In 1982 the U.S. and China encouraged Sihanouk to 
join a DK coalition-in-exile. Secretary of State George Schultz refused to 
support a proposed international genocide tribunal. In 1989 his successor 
James A. Baker even urged that the Khmer Rouge be included in the Cam-
20 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
21 A. Barnett, C. Boua and B. Kiernan, Bureaucracy of Death, New Statesman (Lon-
don), 2 May 1980. 
22 Vonyasa Opium Noyobay Thak ti 11, translation by Justin Jordens, in: A 1991 State 
of Cambodia Political Education Text, p. 8. 
23 E. Becker, When the War Was Over, New York, 1986, p. 440. 
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bodian government. When Japan proposed a commission of inquiry into 
Khmer Rouge crimes, US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon op-
posed the idea, stating on 18 March 1991 that it was "likely to introduce con-
fusion in international peace efforts."24 
Twenty years of U N silence on the Khmer Rouge genocide further en-
couraged Cambodians to ignore the past. After a 1988 meeting of the South-
east Asian countries, the Indonesian chairman noted a consensus opposing 
any return to "the genocidal policies and practices of the Pol Pot regime." 
Yet in 1989, the U N General Assembly declined to identify the perpetrators 
but merely mentioned "the universally condemned policies and practices of 
the recent past." A proposal for U N intervention watered that down to "the 
human rights abuses of a recent past." And the Security Council's five per-
manent members deplored only unspecified, unauthored, undated "policies 
and practices of the past." During the 1991-93 U N operation in Cambodia, 
Pol Pot would enjoy "the same rights, freedoms, and opportunities to partici-
pate in the electoral process" as others.25 
In 1990 the U N Human Rights Sub-commission considered condemning 
the "genocide committed in particular during the period of Khmer Rouge 
rule," and urging states to "bring to trial those who had been responsible for 
crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia, and prevent the return to 
governmental positions of those who were responsible." However, the Sub-
commission deleted this agenda item after speakers denounced its "disser-
vice" to the U N . Only in 1991 did it urge "the international community to 
prevent the recurrence of genocide in Cambodia" and "to take all necessary 
preventive measures." Washington now pledged cooperation in bringing the 
Khmer Rouge to justice. But the next year the director of the UN's Human 
Rights Component in Cambodia deplored its "complete inability to work in 
one of the zones," a feeble criticism of Khmer Rouge obstruction, and he si-
lently assimilated the 1975-79 genocide into what he called "decades of con-
flict, upheaval and confrontation." This obfiiscation made it harder to blame 
Cambodians for failing to face their history. 
24 H. Yamada, Japan's Peace Plan Proposes to Disarm Factions, Daily Yomiuri, 5 May 
1991. See also B. Kiernan (ed.), Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer 
Rouge, the United Nations, and the International Community, New Haven, Yale 
Council on Southeast Asia Studies/Schell Center for International Human Rights, 
Yale Law School, 1993, pp. 207, 255 n.78, 260 n. 137. For consistent statements 
also made by Solomon at the time, see pp. 203-4. For details on Japan's diplomacy, 
see Indochina Digest, 10 May 1991. 
25 See Kieman, "The Inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian Peace Process: 
Causes and Consequences," in Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia. 
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Yet they had no choice. From jungle bases, the Khmer Rouge boycotted 
the UN-organized 1993 elections, and kept killing Cambodian troops and ci-
vilians. Bringing them to justice became U.S. law under President Clinton in 
1994. Two years later, Yale University's Cambodian Genocide Program un-
covered 100,000 pages of secret D K documents revealing the role of top 
Khmer Rouge leaders in the 1975-79 mass killings, and began posting their 
contents at www.yale.edu/cgp. In 1997, Cambodia's rival Prime Ministers, 
Hun Sen and Sihanouk's son Norodom Ranariddh, jointly requested U N aid 
to prosecute D K leaders for their past crimes. The U N Secretary-General ap-
pointed a "Group of Experts" to examine the case. 
As the international lawyers worked, defections and mutinies wracked the 
Khmer Rouge army. Pol Pot died in 1998, and was cremated in the jungle. 
Late that year, his former deputy, Nuon Chea, and the D K head of state, 
Khieu Samphan, surrendered, saying 'Sorry' for their crimes. The Khmer 
Rouge were defeated. Accepting the surrender, Hun Sen offered to "dig a 
hole and bury the past," provoking fears that he no longer favoured a tribu-
nal. Another government spokesman stated that under international law "no 
one can grant amnesty" for crimes against humanity. Arrests of Khmer 
Rouge leaders were "up to the decision of an international tribunal, but the 
tribunal does not take place yet, and so far, there have been no charges 
lodged against these people."26 Within months, however, Cambodian troops 
captured former D K military commander Chhit Choeun (alias Mok) and ar-
rested the former commandant of Tuol Sleng prison, Deuch. Both went to 
jail pending trial. 
In early 1999, the U N Experts recommended charging the surviving D K 
leaders "for crimes against humanity and genocide" perpetrated in 1975— 
1979. As well as committing "war crimes" against Vietnam and Thailand, 
D K had "subjected the people of Cambodia to almost all of the acts" listed in 
the 1948 U N Genocide Convention. 
Evidence suggests the need for prosecutors to investigate the commission of 
genocide against the Cham, Vietnamese and other minority groups, and the Bud-
dhist monkhood. The Khmer Rouge subjected these groups to an especially harsh 
and extensive measure of the acts enumerated in the Convention. The requisite 
intent has support in direct and indirect evidence, including Khmer Rouge state-
ments, eyewitness accounts and the nature and numbers of victims.27 
26 Khieu Kanharith, quoted in Reaksmei Kampuchea, December 28,1998. 
27 Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General As-
sembly resolution 52/135, United Nations, AS, A/53/850, S/l 999/231, March 16, 
1999, Annex, pp. 19-20, 57. 
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Finally pursuing accountability, the U N began negotiations with Hun 
Sen's government for a mixed national/international trial of senior Kltmer 
Rouge leaders. Cambodia's National Assembly passed a "Law on the Estab-
lishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampu-
chea." On June 6, 2003, Cambodia and the U N signed their cooperation 
Agreement. After a year of delays by Cambodian opposition parties, the 
Agreement was expected to be ratified in the National Assembly in August 
2004. 
Under President George W. Bush, it remains unclear whether Washington 
will fulfill U.S. commitments to justice for Cambodians, including the 1994 
U.S. law, or i f Congress will acknowledge them. American leaders ignore 
the earlier U.S. contribution to Cambodia's tragedy. But in 2004, seventeen 
members of Congress co-sponsored a resolution in support of the Khmer 
Rouge tribunal.28 
Twenty-five years after the genocide, Cambodia's tourism ministry plans 
to commercialize the jungle site of Pol Pot's cremation, complete with a lo-
cal Khmer Rouge guide.29 But UN-Cambodian cooperation on a tribunal 
brings legal accountability within reach. On April 9, 2004, Cambodia's Gen-
eral Prosecutor asked local officers "to lay charges, and ask the magistrate to 
issue arrest warrants" for the arrests of former D K leaders Khieu Samphan, 
Nuon Chea, and Ieng Sary. 
A legal accounting of the crimes of the Khmer Rouge era cannot restore 
to Cambodians their lost loved ones, but it could give them back part of their 
lost history. If at last the tribunal goes ahead, Cambodian pupils might one 
day have textbooks to study the tragedy. Pol Pot's ashes have been "scat-
tered to the last," but the growing documentation of his genocide cannot be 
lost like so much of Cambodia's earlier history. 
28 For the text of the Resolution see www.yale.edu/cgp/hcon399ih.html. 
29 A. Sipress, Visit Cambodia! Package Tours to a Despot's Hideout, in: Washington 
Post, April 24,2004, p. A17. 
